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After several difficult years in Anglo-American relations following the fall-out over the Suez 
Crisis in 1956, work to cultivate a more harmonious relationship was well underway by 1959 
as British officials adjusted to the reality of their international situation and as U.S. officials 
sought to shore-up a relationship with an ally whose strategic importance had been reinforced 
in the wake of the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957.
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 Accordingly, on March 20 1959, British 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan journeyed to Washington D.C. for a series of important 
meetings with the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. With Macmillan having recently 
played a key role in attempts to temper a mounting crisis over Berlin, the focus was very 
much on rapprochement. As the New York Times editorialised on the eve of Macmillan’s 
visit: ‘It is a commonplace of contemporary politics that Britain and the United States are 
inseparable allies.’2 
 The following day, Macmillan met with President Eisenhower at the White House and 
the two men travelled together to the Walter Reed Naval Hospital just outside Washington. 
Upon arrival they took the private elevator up to the presidential suite where they were due to 
meet with Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, who had been diagnosed with 
a recurrence of the highly aggressive form of cancer that he had previously fought off in 
1956. The prognosis this time was much less hopeful; both Dulles and Macmillan knew that 
this was likely to be the last time they would see one another.
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 The meeting that followed, 
however, did not adhere to the rapprochement agenda. Instead, the meeting laid bare the 
extent to which emotional responses shaped by perceptions of illness could come to dominate 
high-level diplomacy during the 1950s. Dulles, in the midst of confronting his own mortality, 
harangued Macmillan about what he saw as being Britain’s general failings and weakness; 
the British leader, meanwhile, responded angrily to a man whom he believed had stayed too 
long in office and whose judgement was being affected by his failing health. They clashed 
over their competing views of the right approach to take toward Moscow and decried what 
they saw as the inherent wrong-headedness of each other’s positions. At one point, Dulles 
denounced what he termed ‘Britain’s chronic pathology: the weak-kneed attitude that had 
plagued him throughout his tenure as secretary of state’ and provoked Macmillan into an 
impassioned defence of his nation.
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 Later, writing in his diary, Macmillan pointed to Dulles’s 
illness as being responsible for the direction the meeting had taken and expressed regret at the 
combative turn that their discussion had taken. ‘I felt I ought not to have argued at all with 
this dying man,’ Macmillan wrote. ‘I felt that his illness had made his mind more rigid and 
reverting to very fixed concepts.’5 
 The nature of their discussion demonstrated the extent to which emotional patterns of 
behaviour and socially constructed norms centred on masculinity and ill-health could 
influence leading policymakers at this time. Consequently, this episode provides an entry 
point for considering an area of U.S. foreign policy history that has hitherto remained under-
examined. For while an increasing number of scholars have begun to factor cultural forms of 
power and representation into their assessments of the post-war era, there has been far less 
work on the way that emotions and, within that field, perceptions of illness and disease, 
intersected with dominant tropes of masculinity and influenced the course of diplomacy.
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 To be sure, the path-breaking work of Frank Costigliola is a powerful corrective to 
this. In his study of the Grand Alliance in World War Two, Costigliola demonstrates the way 
that complex emotional patterns of behaviour, often shaped through social interactions and 
influenced by shared confidences and illnesses, affected both the making and the breaking of 
the U.S.-British-Soviet relationship. Here, as Costigliola demonstrates, the interplay between 
emotions and illness was a key factor in shaping diplomatic relations and the outcomes of 
that era were, as a result, highly uncertain.
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 But these patterns underwent a significant shift 
following the onset of the Cold War, when U.S. officials in particular felt pressurised to 
adhere to widely held norms of masculinity lest they be seen as weak and ineffectual.
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Indeed, the emergence of these tropes had a profound impact on U.S. policymakers’ views of 
the world. As Christian Appy has highlighted, ‘Aggressive masculinity shaped American 
Cold War policy...deep-seated ideas about gender and sexuality cannot be dismissed as mere 
talk. They have explanatory value.’9 
  Government officials and politicians thus felt under great pressure to be seen as 
rough, tough, masculine figures ideally suited to waging the Cold War with any deviation 
from this seen as posing a threat to the American national security state.
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 Along with leftist 
political groups and homosexuals, both of whom were subject to government crackdowns in 
the 1940s and 1950s, perceptions of ill health could serve to disrupt these narratives of 
masculine rigour due to the language that typified mid-century American political discourse 
and the way that ill-health was viewed.
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 Illness and the way it is perceived, in social 
constructionist terms, can be ‘shaped by cultural and social systems’ that, in channelling 
Foucalt’s argument that a keen awareness of human normality and abnormality is of 
significant importance in denoting power in modern society, can result in a diagnosis of 
illness being freighted with significant political meaning.
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 Though this phenomenon was in 
no way limited to the Cold War, it was given extra significance at this time due to the abiding 
belief that any signs of weakness, or frailty, were a boon for the Soviets.
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 More broadly, as 
research in medical science has demonstrated, there is a correlation between ill-health in men 
over the age of sixty—as both Dulles and Eisenhower were in the 1950s—and the way it 
influences their subsequent behaviour and perception of their own masculinity.
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By furthering the historiography on masculinity, gender and emotions during the Cold 
War to consider the issue of illness, therefore, this article highlights the ways in which 
perceptions of infirmity influenced foreign relations during the 1950s. It does so by focusing 
primarily on Dulles, a figure who confronted the impacts of illness in a broad range of ways 
during his time as Eisenhower’s secretary of state—from his appraisals of the ill-health being 
suffered by American allies during the first two years of his tenure, to his engagement with 
the consequences of Eisenhower falling ill in the years that followed, to the way that he 
began to reappraise his own position and policies after being stricken with the cancer that 
would eventually kill him in 1959.
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 The influence of these issues typically stemmed from 
domestic political pressures and the fear that U.S. officials held that if they were seen as 
being weak their enemies—both at home and abroad—would be emboldened.16 Traditional 
geopolitical factors, of course, were undoubtedly to the fore in shaping U.S. decisions in this 
period. But while a great deal of work has been produced charting the way those elements 
influenced U.S. policy, far too little has been done on considering the way that emotions and 
perceptions of illness further contextualised these processes. 
After briefly examining the relationship between the Cold War, gender, emotions, and 
perceptions of illness, and highlighting their impact on Dulles and Eisenhower, the article 
identifies the way that U.S. perceptions of the ill-health among British and French leaders 
during the Indochina crisis of 1954 shaped the Eisenhower administration’s determination to 
reject a diplomatic solution. The article subsequently examines the way that these processes 
changed when Eisenhower and Dulles themselves began to suffer from serious illness. The 
emergence of ill-health among the administration’s two leading figures coincided with 
widespread fears in the U.S. about the nation’s capacity to adequately respond to shifts in 
Soviet policy and to counter the alleged existence of a missile gap. Correlations were drawn 
between the sense that American power seemed to be in decline and the fact that its two 
leading political figures were suffering from serious illness, a situation that was believed to 




Thus the article demonstrates the importance for historians in considering more fully 
the way that gendered patterns of behaviour could influence the course of international 
politics. Certain presidencies, of course, have seen more of an emphasis on ill-health given its 
centrality to events during their administrations. This is particularly true of Woodrow Wilson 
and Franklin Roosevelt, both of whom saw illness and infirmity bedevil their attempts to 
foster post-war peace, and John Kennedy, whose time as president was affected by chronic 
ill-health.
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 The nascent Cold War, however, gave these issues a greater salience in everyday 
political discourse. Perceptions of gender and illness mattered in an age of international 
tension, where the health and standing of the nation-state could be influenced by ‘bodily 
characteristics’ that were ‘heavily freighted with values and meanings.’ Weakness in the 
bodies of political leaders was seen as a ‘synecdoche’ for weakness in the body politic of the 
nation more broadly.
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 These pathologies, as this examination of Dulles and his role in U.S. 
diplomacy in the 1950s demonstrates, played an under-examined role in shaping the way that 
American officials understood the world in which they were acting.  
 
Disease, Masculinity and the Cold War 
Anxieties about America’s future—and, in particular, the capacity of American men to meet 
the challenges confronting the nation—were irrevocably altered by the dual shocks of the 
nation’s use of nuclear weapons in Japan and the uncovering of the horrors of the 
Holocaust.
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 One of the most prominent attempts to resolve the challenges that the wartime 
era had thrown up was Arthur Schlesinger Jr’s book, The Vital Center. It is a work that, as 
K.A. Cuordileone has demonstrated, is highly gendered, resting its hopes for the post-war era 
on ‘a secure and restored American masculinity.’21 When seeking to demonstrate the 
potential perils that Soviet Communism posed to the U.S., Schlesinger made reference to the 
body, to health, and to ideas regarding infection and injury. Free society in the twentieth 
century, Schlesinger argued, ‘had been on the defensive, demoralized by the infection of 
anxiety, staggering under the body blows of fascism and Communism....the death pallor will 
indeed come over free society, unless it can recharge the deepest source of its moral 
energy.’22 Illness was seen as a flaw, liable to provoke blame and disgust, and physical fitness 
was seen as a vital indicator of American success.
23
 
The idea of alien ideologies infecting the healthy body politic of nations gained 
significant force during World War Two. In Nazi Germany, Judaism and Germany’s Jewish 
population were repeatedly referred to as ‘bacili,’ ‘bacteria’, and ‘vermin’ posing a threat to 
the nation’s racial purity.24 In the United States, by contrast, the good health of the nation—as 
typified by abundant food and growing economic performance—was seen as protection 
against ‘infections’ like Communism. As Emily Rosenberg has illustrated in her assessment 
of Life’s photo essay ‘The American Look,’ which showcased American women who were 
presented as being the embodiment of good health, the characteristics of these vibrant, 
attractive and healthy women was marked out as something that was ‘constructed by 
environment and performance’ and was, thus, replicable elsewhere. Stockpiles of food at the 
end of the war persuaded the U.S. that it was possible to export American resources and 
alleviate the shortages that were evident in other combatant nations.
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 These views suggested 
that, if Communism was a disease, there was an effective antidote: to eradicate its breeding 
grounds. For Schlesinger, indeed, the entire Cold War could be seen as having two intrinsic 
elements—one of containment, which was to prevent Soviet expansionism, and one of 
‘reconstruction: that is, the removal in non-Communist states of the conditions of want and 
insecurity which invite the spread of Communism.’26 
As the Cold War started to take shape, therefore, a powerful view had taken hold in 
the United States that equated rigorous masculinity and good health with emerging 
perceptions of national security.
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 These views were driven by an inherent sense of 
‘insecurity’—the idea that, by the late 1940s, the U.S. was vulnerable despite its 
extraordinary military and economic power and that Communism, with is power to ‘infect’ 
the nation, posed a mortal danger—that sat alongside the confidence that came from being 
the world’s strongest power and that saw U.S. policymakers adopt ‘a germ, or viral, theory of 
ideas and behaviour.’28 Combating this required leaders that were trenchant, brave, and 
vigorous in order to prevent any perception of weakness providing succour to those who 
sought to undermine the U.S. 
Here, again, the argument was drawing on lessons from the war, particularly the link 
that emerged between perceptions of masculine strength and the health of the nation. Widely 
held images of American troops, typically portraying them as muscled warriors and 
archetypes of American manhood, were highly prominent throughout the war and, in turn, 
became the embodiment of what seemed to characterise U.S. success. Moreover, it was 
accompanied by an attendant sensibility that a serious injury was ‘more deeply emasculating 
than in earlier wars’ because it hindered a person’s capacity to perform their role. In a new 
era of international tension this would evolve into a fear about what infirmity, illness, and 
difference denoted in an age where U.S. security was believed to be imperilled.
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 This went 
hand-in-hand with the view that a nation’s susceptibility to illness and disease, and an 
inability to combat it, came to be seen—in the development-driven argot of the time—as a 
sign of inherent backwardness.
30
   
The emergence of McCarthyism after February 1950, of course, and its intersection 
with the security concerns thrown up by the outbreak of the Korean War, hardened these 
trends and helped to shape an environment in which leading U.S. policymakers felt 
compelled to act and behave in certain ways. Senator Joseph McCarthy’s campaign against 
alleged communists in the upper echelons of the American political system—a movement 
backed both by likeminded Republicans eager to try and undermine the Democratic Party’s 
long run of political success and southern Dixiecrats who saw McCarthy’s views on the Cold 
War as an effective way of undermining growing support for Civil Rights—prompted a 
crackdown against anybody perceived to be acting in a manner that might be considered un-
American.
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 Furthermore, McCarthy’s rhetorical blasts often contained insinuating remarks 
that impugned the masculinity of his targets. This was particularly true of his allegations 
against secretary of state, Dean Acheson, who McCarthy labelled as a ‘pompous diplomat in 
striped pants’ who ‘endorsed communism.’ It was an attack that, as Acheson noted in a 
private letter to a friend, was bitingly personal. ‘I have tried not to let the present barrage of 
charges and innuendoes go below the surface,’ Acheson wrote.32 The broader reaction to this 
reshaping of the American political landscape, as explained by Andrea Friedman, was for 
Cold War liberals to establish ‘their anti-Communist credentials by embracing a rhetoric of 
masculine virility.’33 To speak and to act tough was to protect oneself from McCarthyist jibes 
about effeminacy and being portrayed as a threat to the nation’s security. 
Dulles, like most of his contemporaries, accepted the importance attached to public 
statements and performances of masculine strength as a key component in seeking to be taken 
seriously as an elite U.S. policymaker. A formidable and imposing physical presence, and 
someone who throughout his life revelled in the privations of a log cabin on Duck Island in 
Lake Ontario that was stripped of all modern conveniences, there was something of the 
frontiersman to Dulles despite his role as a very well remunerated Wall St lawyer for much of 
his pre-secretary of state career. In 1948, while assisting Thomas Dewey’s failed bid for the 
presidency, a pre-election feature in Life magazine, written by James Reston, offered a warm 
appraisal of the man deemed likely to take over as secretary of state and, in doing so, 
highlighted his masculine virtues. Dulles, Reston wrote, ‘is well read. He has a sense of 
history, and is good at the vanishing art of simple speech and definition.’ When interrogated 
by willing interlocutors, Reston continued, Dulles would respond ‘as if he had just been 
asked the most brilliant question of the evening. There is never much danger that his reply 
will give you hysterics, but what he says is almost always to the point: clear, intelligent, and 
usually interesting.’ Accompanying the article were a series of photographs of Dulles at work 
and leisure. One of these was particularly eye-catching. Dulles is shown, away from the 
office, in casual trousers, no tie, and with his shirt sleeves rolled up, heartily cleaving a log in 
two with an axe. ‘Chopping wood,’ the caption notes, ‘provides [a] healthy form of exercise 
for the prospective secretary. Here he lays lustily into a log at home near Cold Spring Harbor, 
N.Y.’34 
Though defeat in the election was a bitter blow, Dulles took from it the lesson that it 
was vital to be seen as someone who could prosecute U.S. foreign policy in a rigorous 
manner.
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 A year later, while running for the Senate, Dulles adopted a tough-minded and 
unyielding persona. Following a clash with his opponent, Herbert Lehman, who had labelled 
Dulles a ‘bigot’, Dulles challenged him to a public confrontation. When the offer was refused 
Dulles responded by impugning his masculinity. ‘Even in private life one who insults another 
is expected either to meet him face-to-face or to withdraw the charges,’ Dulles wrote to 
Lehman. ‘I demand that you be man enough to meet me openly or apologize.’36 He adopted a 
similar line when talking publicly about international affairs. In an interview with the radio 
programme, Capital Cloakroom, Dulles argued that an improved position was now evident in 
Europe because ‘our policies over the last 18 months or two years have toughened up greatly 
the fibre of Western Europe.’ He also argued that Moscow had not made greater overtures to 
Germany because they were ‘too afraid’ of relaxing their stringent political controls and 
highlighted what he believed to be a ‘great weakness’ in the Soviet system.37 Similarly, in an 
appearance on Meet the Press, conducted as the campaign neared its conclusion, Dulles was 
asked whether ‘Joe Stalin is afraid of you?’ Naturally, Dulles replied: ‘it’s perfectly apparent 
in everything that they have said and done for the last four years that they consider that I am 
the most formidable single opponent that they have.’38 
Though neither campaign brought electoral success, Dulles continued to cultivate his 
reputation as powerful cold warrior. In his 1950 book, War or Peace, Dulles set forth his 
view that, in order to defeat the Soviets’ attempts for world domination, you had to be tough-
minded. Power, he wrote, ‘is the key to success in dealing with the Soviet leadership.’ Soviet 
leaders, he went on, not only possessed greater power themselves; they also recognised—and 
respected—it in others. But, he concluded, ‘they have only contempt for pleading that stems 
from weakness or fear.’39 
In 1952, when he was asked by Dwight Eisenhower to craft his campaign’s foreign 
policy platform, he again adopted a tough-minded approach and sought to portray the 
Democrats’ policy as one characterised by weakness and fear. ‘It is time that we took 
command of events instead of running hither and thither,’ Dulles told an audience in 
Hartford, Connecticut early in the campaign.
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 He gave these sentiments a fuller airing in an 
essay published in Life. A Republican foreign policy, Dulles argued, would be muscular, 
coherent, and driven; it would reject the craven failings of the policy pursued by Harry 
Truman and his advisors. That debates about isolationism were still evident in America, 
Dulles wrote, was a direct consequence of an approach that ‘minimizes our assets pathetically 
and exaggerates those of Soviet Communism ludicrously. It assumes we are lacking 
strength.’41 Chief among his targets on this front was Truman’s secretary of state, Dean 
Acheson, a figure who for some was considered too urbane and sophisticated to be a vigorous 
opponent of Soviet communism and who Dulles alleged had been ‘exuding fear.’ While he 
did not quite go as far as Joseph McCarthy in his allegations against Acheson, Dulles 
nevertheless imitated elements of the Wisconsin senator’s insidious approach in order to 
besmirch his opponent in the eyes of the electorate. While Acheson ‘rhapsodizes’, Dulles 
argued in a press release two months before the election, ‘realistic terrorists are ruthlessly 
stamping out love of God, love of country and the sense of personal dignity among 
800,000,000 people and fashioning them into an unthinking, unbelieving obedient mass 
animated only by fanatic hatred of the United States.’42 It was a stance that, while tinged with 
hyperbole, nevertheless sat neatly alongside Dulles’s focus on muscular Christianity as a key 
element in the waging of the Cold War and played successfully with an electorate 
increasingly attuned to responding emotively to such imagery.
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These positions were most clearly apparent in the Republican Party Platform, which 
lambasted the Truman administration in highly emotional terms for its corrupt, ineffectual 
and damaging policies that had ‘so undermined the foundations of our Republic as to threaten 
its existence.’ Worse, the Truman administration had squandered the position of strength the 
U.S. had been in at the end of World War Two, pursued the ‘appeasement of Communism at 
home and abroad,’ and ‘abandoned’ millions of people in Eastern Europe to Soviet tyranny. 
‘They swing erratically from timid appeasement to reckless bluster,’ it continued. Republican 
policy, by contrast, would be characterised by ‘courage, self-respect, steadfastness, vision, 
purpose, competence and spiritual faith.’ Four days after the platform was announced, 
Eisenhower adopted a similar tone in accepting the party’s nomination. His aims were to 
‘sweep from office an administration which has fastened on every one of us the wastefulness, 
the arrogance and corruption in high places, the heavy burdens and anxieties which are the 
bitter fruit of a party too long in power.’44 
By the time he became Eisenhower’s secretary of state, then, Dulles had accepted the 
gendered norms of the Cold War and was acting emotionally in his engagement with them. 
For him, toughness and masculine vigour were vital traits in an effective Cold War 
policymaker; any visible deviation from this denoted weakness and insecurity. In the 
administration’s dealings with their British and French allies in their first two years in office, 
these traits, especially in the case of the crisis over Dien Bien Phu in 1954, would play a 
significant role in shaping U.S. policy. 
 
Dulles, Britain and France, and the role of Masculinity and Illness in the Dien Bien Phu 
Crisis 
For all the bluster on the campaign trail, the Eisenhower administration did not pursue 
aggressive confrontations with the Soviets.
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 Nevertheless, in attempting to match-up to their 
stated standards of toughness, Eisenhower and Dulles would often adopt bellicose positions 
in the belief that this would help them to achieve their goals. Furthermore, there was a keen 
sense, at least during Eisenhower’s first term, that brinksmanship worked. Quelling Soviet 
adventurism in Europe, ending the war in Korea, compelling China to back-down in the 
dispute over Quemoy and Matsu that erupted in 1954—all were achieved, the administration 
believed, as a consequence of its stated willingness to adopt tough positions.
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This had two consequences. First, it further conditioned them to see bold, masculine 
positions as being vital in successfully prosecuting the Cold War; and second, it prompted 
frustrated and emotional responses toward Allies who were deemed to be less robust. An 
example of this can be seen in a memorandum Dulles sent to the president-elect before he 
met with Syngman Rhee, the leader of South Korea, in late 1952. Rhee, wrote Dulles, is ‘old 
and feeble. He is highly nervous and moves from fits of great despondency to elation.’ As 
such, he advised, it was his opinion that ‘political matters be discussed as little as possible.’ 
Indeed, the South Korean should be coddled and treated condescendingly—with flattery, 
firmness and reassurance the diplomatic tactics deemed likely to yield the best results.
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But it was with respect to Washington’s main European allies that these sentiments 
were most recurrent. During an early discussion over reforming basic national security policy 
in May 1953, for example, Dulles made the case that American leadership was vital in facing 
up to the threat posed by the Soviets because Europe’s leaders were ‘shattered old men’ who 
could not be relied upon to provide much in the way of support.
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 It was a sensibility that was 
embedded in Dulles’s view of the international situation. He had remained disdainful of 
British resolve since a trip there during the war when, upon his return, he penned a 
memorandum in which he noted that British reluctance to be proactive about the need for a 
sustainable post-war peace stemmed largely from a ‘public psychology which seems 
predominantly defensive of the status quo and which does not adequately appreciate the 
fundamental changes which the war is working.’49 His concerns hardened after the war when 
the Labour Party entered office and launched the welfare state. For Dulles, this suggested the 
loss of fortitude, resolve and adventurism. The emergence of the welfare state, he argued, was 
‘discouraging’ the sort of boldness that had driven previous ages of greatness. ‘Will 
inventions and venture come adequately,’ he asked, ‘from a society where there is no hard 
necessity because everyone is provided for on a survival basis?’50  
Eisenhower shared Dulles’s concerns about the fortitude of Washington’s ally. In 
1951 Winston Churchill had returned to Downing Street as the Conservatives swept back to 
power. But, for Eisenhower, there was growing concern that the British leader was past his 
best. ‘Churchill is as charming and as interesting as ever,’ Eisenhower wrote in his diary 
shortly before his inauguration, but he was ‘quite definitely showing the effects of the passing 
years...I wish that he would turn over leadership of the British Conservative party to younger 
men.’51 Within months the severe health problems being suffered by Churchill and his 
foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, would harden these concerns.  
Eden’s health had been declining for a number of years but, in the spring of 1953, 
what should have been a routine cholecystectomy to solve problems related to jaundice and 
gall stones, resulted in a major biliary tract injury that almost proved fatal.
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 As a result, Eden 
was unable to work for much of 1953 and was replaced, in the short-term, by Churchill who 
said he would serve as his own Foreign Minister.
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 In June, however, on the same day that 
Eden was undergoing another major operation in Boston, Churchill was stricken by a severe 
stroke. In the months that followed, with an out of touch Lord Salisbury filling in at the 
Foreign Office, British foreign policy badly lacked focus and direction.
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Churchill’s health had begun to recover by July and he wrote to Eisenhower and 
informed him that ‘I had a sudden stroke which as it developed completely paralysed my left 
side and affected my speech.’ He had suffered a similar attack, he confided, in 1949: ‘as I 
was out of office I kept this secret and have managed to work through two General Elections 
and a lot of other business since. I am therefore not without hope of pursuing my theme a 
little longer but it will be a few weeks before any opinion can be formed.’55 Two weeks later, 
Churchill informed Eisenhower that he was making ‘a great deal of progress’ and could ‘now 
walk about,’ but that his doctors did not think he would be well enough to appear in public 
until September.
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 Winthrop Aldrich, the U.S. Ambassador in London, met with Churchill in 
September. According to Aldrich’s subsequent report, Churchill strove to convey the image 
of a leader on the cusp of recuperation. ‘He only repeated himself once,’ Aldrich reported. 
‘When I left he walked all the way from the Cabinet room and waved goodbye to me on the 
doorstep. His walking is very much improved and his general condition appeared better than I 
expected.’57  
Unsurprisingly, these events hardened U.S. doubts about Britain’s capacity to be an 
effective Cold War ally. This was particularly true at the Bermuda Conference in December 
1953, where Churchill appeared frail, weak and unable to hear much due to his rapidly 
worsening hearing, and Eden was still visibly recuperating from the effects of his illness.
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Allusions to British weakness thus increasingly began to seep into policy discussions and 
reports, and the language used to describe British policies was often emotive and peppered 
with phrases such as weakness and references to them being afraid. A macabre example of 
this can be seen in Dulles’s appraisal of Churchill’s sudden decision to back the European 
Defense Community (EDC) in 1954 after years of opposition. ‘The old man seems at long 
last to be putting his heart into EDC,’ Dulles wrote to Eisenhower. ‘I hope it is not too late.’59 
U.S. appraisals of French leaders were little better. France had struggled to come to 
terms with the upheavals wrought by the war, and a period of widespread political instability 
had taken root at the same time as attempts to re-establish and maintain the French empire.
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In Southeast Asia, aided by British collusion, they had succeeded in regaining control of 
Indochina (present day Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia); but the situation had soon turned sour 
and war had been raging with Vietnamese nationalists since 1946.
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 After 1945, the French 
were increasingly seen by the U.S. as an insecure and unhelpful ally, too ready to cede 
ground and not wholly committed to the fight against Soviet Communism. As Frank 
Costigliola has argued, Americans ‘diagnosed French anxieties and neutralist leanings as 
symptoms of illness, cowardice, or a lack of manliness.’62 Linkages thus began to be drawn 
between the French inability to stem the nationalist uprising in Indochina and the view that 
France was a sick nation. In September 1953, for example, during discussions with Pierre 
Mendes-France (a leading French politician who would, later, become president), this exact 
point had been raised. The situation in Indochina, Dulles told Mendes-France, was of ‘deep 
interest’ to the U.S. and it was highly important that there was ‘a successful outcome.’ Dulles 
emphasised the ‘impossibility of negotiating from weakness’ and spoke of the ‘necessity of 
building a situation of strength.’ Mendes-France’s reply, while agreeable, seemed to confirm 
U.S. perceptions. The difficulties of France in Indochina, he explained, were ‘primarily 
mental,’ which ‘perhaps makes the situation worse as those are the illnesses most difficult to 
cure.’63 The aforementioned Bermuda Conference offered further evidence on this front. Not 
only were Churchill and Eden suffering; their French counterparts were also ailing badly. 
French president Joseph Laniel was confined to his room for most of the conference with a 
fever; his Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, was feeling the burdens of his task, drinking too 
much, and even fell asleep during a social occasion.
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These concerns coalesced in the spring of 1954 when the battle of Dien Bien Phu 
quickly began to go badly and French leaders appealed to Washington for some form of 
military assistance.
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 The subsequent discussions and strategic considerations—whether the 
U.S. should intervene with troops or, more likely, air power; whether Eisenhower and/or 
Dulles were committed to using some kind of force; whether at some point they offered 
French officials a tactical nuclear weapon—have been poured over by numerous scholars. 
And while there remains much disagreement—particularly over the key issue of whether or 
not U.S. leaders truly wanted to intervene—there is a broad consensus that the administration 
determined that it wanted to take a strong stance and that, in order to do so, it wanted support 
from Congress and Britain.
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Eisenhower and Dulles believed it was vital that the U.S. be seen to be standing firm 
against what was being portrayed as rampant Communist aggression. In a press conference 
on April 7, at which Eisenhower set out the oft-cited domino theory, the president responded 
to a question from a reporter by stressing the importance of the U.S. being stout-hearted. He 
had urged the nation to ‘realize that we are 160 million of the most productive and the most 
intelligent people on earth’, he explained, and had asked them ‘why are we going around 
being too scared?’67 Congress, however, soon made it clear that they would only offer their 
support for threatened military action if Britain and France were in agreement. Consequently, 
Dulles was dispatched across the Atlantic in an attempt to broker a deal that would see 
Washington, London and Paris agree on a way forward in Indochina.  
Any hopes that Dulles had of reaching a swift agreement with the British were soon 
dispelled once he met with Eden. Surely it was better, Eden argued, to pursue a diplomatic 
track and broker a binding peace deal even if it seemed to come from a position of 
weakness.
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 With Eden unwilling to budge, and Dulles growing increasingly frustrated, an 
impasse was soon reached. Tellingly, as Dulles fed back to Washington he peppered his 
reports with descriptions of Churchill’s health and more emotional phrases that suggested the 
British were frightened. In one report, following two frustrating days of talks, Dulles began 
by noting:  
The Prime Minister’s physical condition seemed to have deteriorated. He 
enunciated about as usual, and at the end of the evening, walked down two flights 
of stairs with me to the door where we were photographed together. He seemed, 




The following day, in what was an otherwise positive report, Dulles noted that the British 
‘are extremely fearful of becoming involved with ground forces in Indochina.’70 
By the time he arrived in Paris a few days later, Dulles was beginning to see the 
mental and physical failings of Washington’s allies at every turn. In an effort to persuade 
Georges Bidault of the need to adopt a strong stance, he told the French foreign minister that 
it was now vital that the French government ‘demonstrate its capacity to act’ as ‘there was no 
weakness greater than indecision.’71 Bidault, he reported back to Eisenhower, ‘gives the 
impression of a man close to the breaking point...it has been painful to watch him presiding 
over the Council at this afternoon’s long session. He is obviously exhausted and is confused 
and rambling in his talk.’72 Eisenhower told his chief diplomat that he wanted to make sure 
that British and French leaders appreciated the ‘gravity of the situation’ and that they would 
not be able ‘merely to shut their eyes and later plead blindness as an alibi for failing to 
propose a positive program.’73 Dulles subsequently captured the mounting sense of gloom 
that he had perceived in Paris with a further report to Eisenhower. ‘Dien Bien Phu has 
become a symbol in the mind of the French people,’ Dulles reported, and it had become ‘a 
tremendously emotional thing.’74 
A sense of how this was affecting Dulles’s appraisals can be seen in a note that he 
penned to Bidault on April 24. The situation, Dulles wrote, evoked ‘a determination to 
combine ever more closely and more vigorously with our trusted allies’: 
We believe that it is the nature of our nations to react vigorously to temporary 
setbacks and to surmount them. That can be done in relation to the present 
situation if our nations and people have the resolution and the will. We believe 
that you can count upon us, and we hope that we can count upon you.
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A day later, from Geneva now, where leaders from all the main nations had gathered for an 
international conference to settle on peace deals in Korea and Indochina, Dulles reported that 
Eden had come out against the idea of intervention.  Warning Eden that, absent a bold 
‘declaration of common intent’ to stiffen French resolve, their position in Indochina was 
liable to collapse, Dulles noted his view that British leaders were providing so little in the 
‘way of comfort to the French that the prospect’ of Paris ‘standing firm here was now very 
slight.’76 Later, after further talks with Bidault and Eden, Dulles wrote that the French 
position was ‘rather confused’ and that the British position was characterised by ‘fear’ over 
the prospect of intervention. ‘I intend to see Eden alone tomorrow morning,’ Dulles 
continued, ‘to talk with extreme bluntness to him expressing my dismay that British are 
apparently encouraging French in direction [of] surrender.’77 
Dulles’s annoyance with British and French leaders was escalating. The United States 
was prepared to stand firm and not deal with the Communists; Britain and France seemed to 
be scared and unwilling to act. On April 29 Dulles reported that the ‘UK attitude is one of 
increasing weakness’ and suggestions that nuclear weapons might be a viable option had 
‘badly frightened them.’ In a general summary, Dulles ranged more broadly. ‘The decline of 
France, the great weakness of Italy, and the considerable weakness in England,’ Dulles wrote, 
‘create a situation where I think that if we ourselves are clear what must be done, we must be 
prepared to take the leadership in what we think is the right course.’ This did not mean he 
was advocating war, Dulles clarified, but it did mean that it was incumbent upon the U.S. to 
determine the way forward.
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 During a conversation with Eden the following day Dulles 
raged at his British counterpart. At an international meeting of such importance, he said, ‘we 
were presenting a pathetic spectacle of drifting without any agreed policy or purpose.’ If 
cooperation over Korea and Indochina was not possible, the U.S. would be compelled to 
‘consider who there was upon whom we could depend.’79 
These recurring sentiments—constantly impugning the masculinity of British and 
French leaders; remarks about the physical and mental sufferings prevalent among officials in 
both nations—shaped U.S. attempts to conceptualise the debates over Indochina. The 
gendered norms of the Cold War, and U.S. perceptions of what was required in order to avoid 
accusations of weakness, fostered a determination not to settle for a peace deal that, in 
American eyes, was tantamount to appeasement.
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 Consequently, they continually came back 
to the point that it was necessary to bolster British and French leaders and compel them to 
adopt a tougher stance. This could be seen in an NSC briefing memo, produced on the day 
after Dien Bien Phu had finally fallen, which asked if it was possible for the U.S. to ‘stiffen 
their [Britain and France] spines by any conceivable means.’81  
By the time that the Geneva Conference came to discuss peace in Indochina, 
therefore, the Eisenhower administration was fundamentally opposed to any negotiated 
peace. It was a stance that blinded U.S. officials to the strengths in Eden’s position, who had 
come to see, albeit belatedly, that a negotiated peace was the only way to avoid an expanded 
and ruinous war. Indeed, Eden’s view was that American machinations and the lack of clarity 
over whether they were serious about the possibility of using force had actually weakened 
French resolve.
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 When a peace deal was eventually agreed in July, the U.S. delegation—
there only in an observational capacity—refused to sign it. This, as Eisenhower reminded the 
press, meant that the U.S. was not bound by the treaty and would respond to any ‘renewal’ of 
‘Communist aggression.’83 Even here, Dulles rather fancifully sought to suggest that the fact 
that U.S. involvement had been required to break a pre-agreement impasse was an assertion 
of American strength. He told the National Security Council on July 15 that: 
He wished to emphasize that from the psychological standpoint our decision to 
return [to Geneva] had been a grave blow to the Communists. The fact that the 
entire Geneva Conference had ground to a standstill when Mendes-France left for 
Paris to talk to an American Secretary of State, and that Chou En-lai and Molotov 
had cooled their heels during this interval, had punctured the Communist prestige 
which had been built up so high at Geneva. All this indicated that when it really 
comes down to something important, the United States is the key nation. This had 
been a matter of great chagrin to the Communists.
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It was a hollow point and elided the fact that gendered and emotional patterns of 
behaviour, and the explanatory context of British and French leaders’ ill-health, had helped to 
condition U.S. officials to adopt an unworkable stance over the crisis. For Dulles, the key 
point had always been that the U.S.—and, ideally, its allies—needed to be seen to be willing 
to stand firm against Communist expansion in Asia. As he explained to an aide a few years 
afterwards ‘the important thing was that we kept the pressure on the Communists...if they had 
thought we would do less than we were prepared to do, they might have pushed for more, or 
all of Vietnam. That would have really been dangerous.’85 Eden’s focus on diplomacy, then, 
was antithetical to the pervading cultural norms in the U.S. and, as such, was explained 
through reference to perceptions of British and European weakness. It was a point 
encapsulated later in an oral history interview by State Department official, Theodore 
Achilles. ‘Mr Eden had not been well,’ he told the interviewer, ‘and I think we all had a 
feeling that he had almost a dilettante approach to the thing. He did not seem to be taking 
things particularly seriously. I think we all, on the Delegation [at Geneva], had somewhat that 
feeling.’86 
 
Eisenhower’s Heart Attack and the Battle for Hearts and Minds 
The trenchancy of the administration’s position over Indochina had resulted in a confused 
policy; the desire to be seen to be acting from a position of strength had fatally undermined a 
realistic chance of brokering a sustainable peace in Southeast Asia. If this episode 
demonstrated the way that masculinity, emotions, and perceptions of illness could lead to a 
more aggressive stance, however, the situation changed dramatically in 1955 when first 
Eisenhower, and then Dulles, were themselves struck down with serious illness. Suddenly, 
U.S. officials began to worry about America’s role in the world and fretted over whether 
signs of illness among their leading figures were emboldening a new group of Soviet leaders 
who had come to power following Josef Stalin’s death in 1953. 
 In September 1955, the president had been stricken by a moderate heart attack, which 
left him recuperating in Denver for several months. Remarkably, his illness was greeted with 
great sanguinity at home despite the fact that he was out of the White House for a prolonged 
period. He was pictured on his birthday in a wheelchair at the hospital; his shirt had been 
embroidered with the words ‘much better thanks’; and, as a recent biography notes, the 
president believed that things were ‘running so smoothly in Washington’ that he ‘ruled out 
any return until he could walk into the White House without assistance.’ Nevertheless, the 
attack did make him question whether or not he should stand for re-election. His mood was 
low, as is wont to be the case among those that have suffered heart problems, and he became 
obsessive about his health. Eventually, he did decide to stand and, despite further scares, went 
on to serve a full second term.
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 Yet fears abounded in Washington as to whether the president’s health problems were 
undermining their international position. In particular, U.S. officials worried about how 
Soviet leaders would interpret Eisenhower’s position. In an NSC meeting over policy toward 
the Middle East a week after Eisenhower’s heart attack, Vice President Richard Nixon 
clarified the fear that had underpinned much of the discussion. ‘If things go badly for the 
United States in this area,’ he said, ‘there will be many who say that our misfortunes result 
from a lack of leadership.’88 Efforts were thus made to ensure that it did not seem as if U.S. 
policy-making was in crisis. After a report in the Washington Post suggested that the Kremlin 
had determined it would ‘go slow in dealing with the West’ as a result of the president’s 
illness, for example, Dulles responded by stating that Eisenhower’s recuperation had ‘not 
interfered with carrying out the Nation’s foreign policy.’89 As the president’s absence became 
more prolonged, however, the concerns increased. At a press conference in mid-October, 
Dulles mounted a stronger defence, one which belaboured the fact that the president’s 
strength seemed to be returning and suggested he was overcompensating. Upon meeting with 
Eisenhower for the second time since his heart attack, Dulles told the press, ‘I found very 
distinct evidence of more vigor—more vigorous health. His mind was as vigorous as it could 
be last time, and again this time there was more evidence of physical robustness.’90  
 Notwithstanding these efforts, observers soon began to discern patterns between shifts 
in Soviet policy and Eisenhower’s absence. Furthermore, the press began to suggest that 
illness in the administration was equating to less sure-footed leadership. Would the Soviets 
negotiate ‘seriously’ at a forthcoming summit in Geneva, the Washington Post’s editorial 
staff asked, ‘without the galvanizing influence of President Eisenhower?’ More importantly, 
had the president’s illness, coupled with the likelihood that he would not stand for re-election, 
prompted ‘Soviet leaders to alter their plans?’ Under such circumstances, the piece 
concluded, it was vital that the U.S. and its ‘Western Allies give evidence that they are 
resilient in their own planning.’91 A more pugnacious Soviet policy—as evidenced by the 
failure of talks at Geneva and bolder moves by Moscow in the Third World—led to concerns 
that this had come in response to the president’s health worries.92 It was a point made directly 
by the journalist, Chalmers Roberts, who in reporting on the 1955 Geneva Conference wrote: 
‘A good many diplomats [in Geneva] felt that one reason Moscow was so abrupt’ was ‘due to 
Eisenhower’s illness and resulting uncertainty over who will speak for America during the 
next presidential term.’93 Doubts about how Eisenhower’s illness made Washington look, 
meanwhile, were factoring into the administration’s thinking. Foster Dulles, for one, was torn 
between not spending too much time away from Washington and not altering his plans 
because Eisenhower had fallen ill. Richard Nixon agreed with Dulles’s assessment that he 
should not be away for too long, but was also at pains to point to out that it would be ‘bad’ if 
Dulles was seen to be ‘changing his plans because of the President’s illness.’94 
One outcome of this was a move by Dulles to forestall Soviet attempts to follow up 
the Geneva Summit with an official visit to the U.S. by persuading Eisenhower to reject the 
idea and by offering a public statement about the Cold War’s ongoing importance.95 A larger 
consequence, however, was the fact that concerns prompted by Eisenhower’s illness fed into 
wider alarm about Soviet attempts to expand their international influence, especially in the 
so-called Third World. By 1955 the administration had developed a wide-ranging policy of 
propaganda and public relations aimed at courting people across the world to side with the 
U.S. rather than the Soviets.
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 When Moscow launched a corresponding attempt in the years 
after Stalin’s death, the U.S. response was one of alarm. It was a stance, as Robert McMahon 
has argued, that was disproportionate. That it emerged at the same time as Eisenhower’s 
ongoing recovery and broader concerns about what this meant for U.S. policy is highly 
significant. ‘The sense of impending peril is likely to increase,’ McMahon has argued, ‘when 
a nation, like an individual, lacks confidence in its ability to fend off potential threats.’97 With 
the president recuperating and absent from the White House, and with real doubts surfacing 
about whether or not he would stand for a second term, the perceived shifts in Soviet policy 
prompted great concern as U.S. officials’ confidence in their capacity to see off the challenge 
was correspondingly diminished. 
There were fears, too, about whether the image of the U.S. president suffering from 
such a severe illness had impacted negatively on the way that governments and people in the 
West viewed American power. One such episode came prior to a planned trip to Washington 
by British officials in early 1956, which saw perceptions of the president’s health playing a 
key part in broader considerations about the West’s position in the Cold War. Eden, who had 
finally replaced Churchill as prime minister, was eager to bolster Britain’s position in terms 
of international leadership.
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 Accordingly, Eden wrote to Eisenhower and indicated his desire 
for an Anglo-American meeting. However, he closed with a caveat. ‘I would not want to 
make any suggestion,’ Eden explained, ‘that could put any strain upon your health.’99 
U.S. officials were not unsympathetic to Eden’s desire to try and boost Anglo-
American relations; yet they were concerned that it would be difficult for any discussions to 
be too exacting as they were uncertain as to the president’s fortitude. In light of his recent 
health problems, one advisor wrote to Dulles, ‘it would be placing too great a burden on him 
to ask him to go into all the detailed and multiple facets of the various foreign policy 
problems.’100 This appraisal chimed with a briefing sent to Washington from the U.S. 
Embassy in London just ahead of Eden’s visit in January 1956. Generally, the report 
explained, British views of the United States were good. Nevertheless, there were concerns 
among some areas of the general population as to the ‘soundness and vigor’ of Anglo-
American ‘responses to new international challenges.’ Churchill’s retirement was one 
explanation for this; another was concerns over Eisenhower’s physical well-being. In the face 
of a new Soviet policy, some sections of British society were thus concerned about whether 
‘American and British leadership are coping adequately with the old enemy in a new 
guise.’101 
The period after Eisenhower’s heart attack, then, led to considerable shifts in the way 
that U.S. policymakers viewed the international situation and made them more susceptible to 
fears about American power. At the same time, the administration began to reappraise its 
previous stance on nuclear weapons—moving away from the belligerence and brinksmanship 
of their first two years in office toward a more circumspect stance that looked to minimise 
risk.
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 On a more minor level, it also prompted a shift in the way that Dulles perceived 
matters of ill-health and infirmity. Following Eisenhower’s illness, for instance, his 
perception of the president began to change. Whereas previously Dulles had believed they 
saw most matters in a similar fashion, he was less sure about Eisenhower’s actions in the 
period after his heart attack and saw his behaviour as increasingly ‘unpredictable.’103 The 
reconsiderations prompted in the wake of the president’s illness, however, were given a much 
sharper edge in late 1956 when Dulles himself fell seriously ill and began to witness at first-
hand the way that such misfortunes could affect the way in which he was perceived. 
 
Cancer, Eisenhower’s Stroke, and the Democrats’ Challenge 
On November 3, 1956, after a period of intense diplomatic activity, Dulles awoke with 
crippling stomach pains and uncontrollable shivers. His doctor was called and, after a brief 
and inconclusive consultation, it was decided that he should be admitted to hospital 
immediately. Unable to walk, and with the spiral staircase in his Georgetown home making 
any attempt to carry him to an ambulance on a stretcher impossible, Dulles instead bumped 
himself down the stairs on his rear, barking instructions to an aide about what work needed to 
be dealt with while he was incapacitated. Exploratory surgery was required to ascertain the 
nature of the problem: a cancerous growth that had burst through his large intestine. The 
cancer was removed, as was the damaged portion of his intestine, and an eager for 
information patient was told what the cause had been.
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 Attempts were immediately made to reassert Dulles’s vitality. Eisenhower told the 
press that Dulles had ‘devoted himself unselfishly to his complicated and strenuous duties—
even, as it is now apparent, at the risk of his own health. He has given untiringly of himself to 
the cause of world peace based on justice.’105 Dulles might be ill, in other words, but only 
because he had committed so much of himself to the fight against Communism. 
Notwithstanding this effort by the administration to shape the narrative surrounding Dulles’s 
illness, concerns were raised in the press as to whether his sufferings were a result of an 
unsustainable schedule. After noting that he was already sixty-eight, the Washington Post 
reported that ‘for nearly four years he has been dashing around the world in his country’s 
service as though he were, let us say, two-thirds that age. Maybe he dashed too rapidly and 
too far.’106  
The difference between these two interpretations was significant. The administration’s 
line painted Dulles in heroic terms and suggested he had been laid low by the vigour with 
which he had pursued the anti-Communist crusade. The press angle, by contrast, was one that 
suggested an infirmity within the administration and that portrayed Dulles as being unable to 
endure the difficulties of waging the Cold War. Thus, the administration attached significant 
importance to reinforcing its position. In a press conference less than two weeks after Dulles 
fell ill, Eisenhower used the opportunity to reference UN Secretary General Dag 
Hammarskjold’s efforts in pursuing peace in the Middle East and Eastern Europe as a way to 
restate his position on Dulles.  
I should like to take just a moment to say what he [Hammarskjold] has been 
doing. The man's abilities have not only been proven, but a physical stamina that 
is almost remarkable, almost unique in the world, has also been demonstrated by a 
man who night after night has gone with 1 or 2 hours’ sleep, working all day...In 
the same way, although Foster Dulles is in the hospital, every day he is thinking 
and working on these problems...I am happy to say, by the way, that he is so far as 




 Eisenhower’s points of reference were the emerging crisis in Hungary, where Soviet 
forces were quashing an anti-government uprising with brutal force, and the Middle East, 
where Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal had kick-started a process that had culminated, in 
late October and early November, with Britain, France and Israel launching military action in 
order to retake the canal zone. Dulles’s illness, indeed, incapacitated him right at the point 
that the Suez Crisis was reaching its climax, as the U.S. was confronted with the decision of 
whether to back its European allies or whether to turn against them and support Arab 
nationalism. Though confined to hospital, Dulles nevertheless played a key role in 
determining that the U.S. would force Britain and France to withdraw from Egyptian 
territory. Eden, whom the crisis exacted a huge personal toll on, later cited Dulles’s illness as 
being a major factor in the U.S. decision to turn against him.
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 Though as much impetus for 
this came from others within the administration—not least deputy secretary of state Herbert 
Hoover Jr—Eden’s views are given extra credence by a recollection in Dean Rusk’s memoirs 
about a meeting he had with Dulles in the latter’s hospital room in the spring of 1959. Rusk, 
who would later serve as John Kennedy’s secretary of state, recounted how Dulles had 
spoken about things ‘a dying man has on his mind’ and explained that Dulles had told him, 
‘Dean, I would not have made certain decisions about Suez had I not been sick at the time.’109 
Frustratingly, Dulles did not go on—at least in Rusk’s telling—to provide any thoughts on 
what, specifically, he would have done differently. Nevertheless, it does illustrate the fact 
that, from the moment he was struck down and rushed to hospital, Dulles’s own views and 
the way that others perceived him began to shift.  
In the press, doubts were raised as to whether Dulles would be able to continue to 
serve a full second term now that Eisenhower had been re-elected. One report in the 
Washington Post suggested that his carrying on ‘seems pretty close to impossible for a man 
who has undergone an operation for cancer.’ Marquis Childs, similarly, wrote that there was 
much anxiety about Dulles’s condition ‘since it is assumed that a man who has had a major 
operation for cancer at the age of 68 cannot carry on for long in the incredibly demanding job 
of Secretary of State.’110 
 It was a question Dulles had asked himself. At the very least, he concluded, he could 
not carry on as he had before: flying around the world to diplomatic meetings and spending 
so much time overseas. The indefatigable strength and vigour that had been his hallmarks 
seemed to be waning and this, in turn, began to affect his capacity to achieve his goals. A 
week before he was rushed to hospital, in fact, Dulles confided in the president, telling him 
that he was inclined to continue ‘as long as I felt physically up to it’ but that changes would 
have to be implemented. ‘I said I did not think I could go on at the pace I had been going and 
that it would be necessary for me to have as Under Secretary someone that would be more or 
less understood to be prepared to take over and who with that prestige would be able to 
lighten my load.’111 This was not the only time that Dulles mentioned the prospect of 
retirement. In September 1957, he told Eisenhower that he was keen not to ‘let matters drift’ 
and to reach a decision about how long he should serve sooner rather than later.
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 The 
following year, when the symptoms of his returning cancer were starting to present, he spoke 
more forcibly about retirement to Richard Nixon. In a highly confidential meeting in 
November 1958, Dulles confided that ‘it might be better’ if he stood down and let ‘a younger 
man’ take over ‘who could have two years in which to make good.’ Within weeks of this 
meeting he would begin to experience severe stomach pains and rapidly lose weight. ‘If a 
situation developed where I felt that my health did not enable me to do a good job,’ Dulles 
continued presciently, ‘I would of course quit.’113 
 Dulles would not, ultimately, leave his post quite that readily. But these examples 
demonstrate the way that his diminished health began to influence his views of his own 
strength and fortitude. Illness made him more fatalistic, less certain, and more likely to 
acknowledge frailty. Given how central his trenchant statements on the importance of strong, 
masculine policies had been in previous years this was quite a shift. Now, for the first time, 
Dulles seemed to doubt both his longevity and his capacity to achieve his aims. The wider 
political context in the United States at this time, furthermore, only served to heighten these 
concerns. For someone who had so visibly railed against the infirmities of British and French 
leaders in 1954, and who had impugned the manhood of Democratic leaders in 1952, it was 
quite a transformation. 
 A sharp illustration of how his illness would come to affect the way that others 
viewed him can be seen in the Congressional debates that took place in early 1957 over a 
proposed change in the administration’s policy toward the Middle East. Amid concerns that 
Suez had created a vacuum that the Soviets might seek to fill, the Eisenhower administration 
launched a new policy for the region that would enable them to play a more active role. What 
later became labelled as the Eisenhower Doctrine was a wide-ranging commitment to protect 
the area’s security through the infusion of $200 million in economic and military assistance 
and a pledge to commit U.S. troops to aid any country in the region that requested assistance 
against international communism.
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 Getting this through Congress, however, was far from 
straightforward and, in early 1957, Dulles led an attempt to get the necessary legislation 
passed. That Congress would play hardball over this was hardly surprising. But what was 
different was the way that their opposition to Dulles prompted both the secretary and those 
close to him to respond. Dulles was hardly unused to being disliked and serving as the focus 
of criticism from the administration’s opponents; but, at this point, the criticisms seemed to 
have more consequence. Dulles felt exposed and, furthermore, was being perceived as such 
by colleagues and the press. 
 Among the plan’s opponents on Capitol Hill, Democrat senators Hubert Humphrey 
and J. William Fulbright were perhaps the most forceful. In their statements on this matter it 
is not difficult to discern signs that they now perceived Dulles as being vulnerable. Not only 
did Humphrey note that Dulles’s ‘usefulness may be nearing an end’; it was also telling that 
he chose to use numerous medical terms in making his case. ‘Dr. Dulles,’ he stated, ‘has not 
diagnosed the situation or prescribed correctly for it...Mr. Dulles may well be a casualty of 
the cold war, just as Mr Eden was.’115 Fulbright, while using fewer medical metaphors, was 
no less vituperative. Dulles, he charged, had pursued policies that ‘have been harmful to our 
interests’ and intended to ‘weaken the influence of the Free World in the Middle East.’116 The 
impact, on both sides of the political divide, was to portray Dulles as weak and thus liable to 
enact weak policies. It was a stance that was taken up by the conservative magazine, the 
National Review, who in their assessment of Dulles’s role also utilised language inflected 
with barbed medical meaning. Dulles, a highly critical column argued, did not ‘know what he 
is doing’—he was ‘fighting for his life’; if he lost this battle with Congress he would be 
‘through’ and should ‘step down now.’117 
 Eisenhower sought to offer his support by reaffirming his abiding faith in Dulles and 
meeting with Congressional leaders to give him his backing.
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 Despite the president’s show 
of support, in private those close to Dulles were speaking in highly sympathetic terms about 
his ordeal. Clare Booth Luce, a U.S. Ambassador and wife of Time editor Henry, called 
Dulles and advised him ‘to keep your chin up’ because ‘all of this is so exaggerated.’119 
There were also signs of sympathy. His sister, Eleanor, wrote to a close friend in early 
1957—Cecil Lyon, the U.S. Ambassador in Chile—and noted that the secretary had been 
having a rough time, had suffered a ‘gruelling week’ and was thoroughly ‘tired’, though she 
believed he would prove able to ‘take another week or so if that is to be.’ ‘How wonderfully 
the Secretary has borne up under it,’ Lyon responded. ‘He is splendid, but why should he 
have to be?’120 Administration spokespeople, concerned at the implications of Dulles’s 
struggle, sought to convey the message that all was well and, most importantly, that 
Eisenhower’s government retained sufficient vigour to effectively prosecute the Cold War. In 
among the fevered Congressional debates, indeed, one of the president’s aides spoke before a 
regional Republican organisation and pointedly noted that Eisenhower’s recent actions left 
‘no “doubt as to his physical ability”.’121  
 Fears that ill-health among the administration’s most visible figures might undermine 
the U.S. position in the Cold War were heightened in the autumn of 1957 when, for the first 
time, doubts about America’s technological supremacy came to the fore.122 The catalyst for 
this shift was the successful Soviet launch of Sputnik—the first satellite put into orbit around 
the Earth—which prompted a hail of criticism about why U.S. policymakers had allowed this 
to happen.
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 In Congress, allegations about a missile gap began to surface and calls were 
made for a dramatic expansion of defence spending as a result of the fact that the U.S. was 
now believed to be highly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Though Eisenhower and Dulles 
knew that the missile gap was an illusion and were never likely to sanction massive increases 
in defence spending, they also recognised that it was a troubling image that provided their 
opponents with a powerful line of attack.
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An added complication on this front was the president’s continuing ill-health. After 
his heart attack in 1955, Eisenhower had endured a severe case of ileitis in 1956 and, in 
November 1957, suffered a stroke. As Richard Nixon later wrote, the view within the 
administration was that ‘this was the worst time possible, short of outright war, for the 
President to be incapacitated.’ The successful launch of Sputnik just a month previously, 
Nixon explained, meant that ‘the whole structure of America’s military might and scientific 
technology was under suspicion here and throughout the world.’125 At the same time, the 
wider public response was one of deep concern. ‘The public,’ Nixon wrote, ‘seemed to say: 
okay, he may get well, but will he ever be the same again? I received hundreds of letters 
evoking the mythology of the dark ages on insanity, mental aberrations, and the like.’ Some 
sections of the press, meanwhile, responded by calling on Eisenhower to resign and 
referencing the fact that, if he survived, he would ‘be past seventy’ and the oldest president in 
the nation’s history by the end of his second term.126 Eisenhower’s response was to tackle his 
duties with renewed vigour, well aware that any sign of impaired performance would damage 
his credibility. ‘Extremely sensitive to any suggestion that he was not able to do the job,’ 
Nixon wrote, ‘the President brushed aside any expressions of sympathy and struggled to 
avoid giving any impression of weakness or disability.’127  
These issues raised fears about American strength to significant new levels. The 
United States, leading Democrats and high-profile commentators began to argue, appeared to 
be in the midst of a serious decline.
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 Worse, this went far deeper than a possible shortfall in 
ballistic missiles. America, these commentators worried, was losing its will and its capacity 
to fight against the Soviets. In his nationally syndicated column, Walter Lippmann argued 
that the nation’s inability to respond effectively to Sputnik and the missile gap—as evidenced 
by months of indecision by the administration and the absence of any clear alternative from 
the Democrats—was due to a general unwillingness to take tough decisions. ‘What the 
experts call a missile lag,’ Lippmann wrote on August 21 1958, ‘is essentially a weakness in 
American education and a lack of seriousness in American national purpose, when there is a 
choice between private pleasures and the public interest.’ This, Lippmann argued, required a 
change in attitude. ‘We are in competition with a new society which is in deadly earnest,’ he 
wrote, ‘and there is no use pretending that amidst our comforts and our pleasures we are 
serious enough.’129 
It was a theme that was attracting an increasing amount of interest among prominent 
Democrats who were starting to position themselves for a run at the White House in 1960. 
Chief among the latter was the young Massachusetts Senator, John F. Kennedy, and the self-
styled action intellectuals who advised him.
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 From 1957 onwards, Kennedy and those close 
to him cultivated the idea that America was going soft—that it lacked vigour, courage, 
braveness, and the willingness to endure hardships in order to pursue foreign policy success. 
It proved a powerful image. Wider cultural norms, specifically the idea that the U.S. was 
increasingly in thrall to ‘momism’ and was being emasculated by its fixation on consumerism 
and the easy life, also fed into this process. The broad popularity of the novel The Ugly 
American, which rather crudely contrasted the effete embassy-bound overseas diplomats who 
had grown too comfortable with the rough, tough frontiersmen out in the field who were 




But if these lines of attack had credence because they fed into archetypal views about 
what American manhood should look like, they had a wider salience because the charges 
being made seemed to chime with the image of a president and secretary of state who were 
stricken with ill-health. In a speech in Atlantic City in September 1958, Kennedy charged 
Eisenhower and Dulles with overseeing a period of neglect. ‘Drift and indecision,’ he 
charged, ‘are incapable of meeting the problem of change—and the world has changed in the 
last six years.’ Kennedy’s conclusion was to paint the Eisenhower administration as lacking 
in manly resolve. ‘I will tell you who is selling America short,’ Kennedy stated: ‘it is the little 
men with little vision who say we cannot afford to build the world’s greatest defense against 
aggression—it is those who say we cannot afford to bolster the free world against the ravages 
of hunger and disease and disorder upon which Communism feeds.’132  
Accordingly, the administration was under pressure to respond lest allegations of the 
missile gap, drift and indecision, as well as the persistent image of illness among high-level 
officials, combined to undermine their credibility. A chastening set of results in the mid-term 
elections in November 1958 compelled the president to reflect on the fact that, just maybe, 
his party was seen as being old and tired. In a lengthy reflection on the elections and 
summaries of conversations with Nixon and Republican strategists over how to respond to 
the Democrats’ gains in Congress, Eisenhower twice referred to the need for an influx of 
young talent into the Republican Party. A grassroots organization should be formed, he 
wrote, which ‘should emphasise youth, vigor, and progress’ so that local parties would be 
filled with ‘the finest young leaders we can find.’ Similarly, attractive and youthful 
candidates must be found to stand for office and these should be ‘young and vigorous and 
intelligent.’133 Though he did not state it explicitly, the implication was clear: Eisenhower 
feared that, in the wake of the rise of Democrats like Kennedy and his and Dulles’s illnesses, 
his own party looked tired and old. 
 Eisenhower also came to suspect that he and Dulles no longer fully saw eye to eye 
when it came to the Soviets. Dulles, Eisenhower confided in his diary in January 1958, 
approached the problem of the Soviets as a lawyer would—‘he consistently adheres to a very 
logical explanation’ of the ‘difficulties in which we find ourselves with the Soviets.’ This was 
all well and good, Eisenhower continued, and it was only right that the U.S. should ‘have a 
concern and respect for fact and reiteration of official position’, but at the same time, ‘we are 
likewise trying to “seek friends and influence people”.’134 On this front, moreover, 
Eisenhower was not entirely wrong: he and Dulles were starting to adopt different tacks when 
it came to the matter of geopolitics. Whereas Eisenhower in the wake of his stroke had 
become more tough-minded and likely to adopt robust positions on matters of national 
security, Dulles was increasingly taking a more moderate line. This was not uniformly true, 
by any means, as the account of his meeting with Harold Macmillan in 1959 makes clear. But 
there was an emerging pattern that backed-up Eisenhower’s suspicions. Following the 
diagnosis of his cancer in 1956, indeed, Dulles proved more willing to pursue policies that 
were characterised by compromise and agreement rather than dogmatic adherence to a 
position of toughness. In contrast to his stance over Indochina in 1954, for example, his 
arguments with respect to the Middle East were markedly less belligerent. Whereas in 
Indochina he had advocated taking a combative position in order to prove the nation’s 
willingness to stand firm, his approach in the Middle East advocated the sort of compromise 
he had ruled out in Southeast Asia. Any talk of a ‘showdown’ with the Soviets, Dulles 
advised in December 1956, was a non-starter: ‘we must rely on the basic soundness of our 
position and the growth of internal difficulties within the Soviet orbit.’135  
In late 1958, Dulles again began to suffer from illness. His doctors initially diagnosed 
a hernia and an abdominal inflammation, but the pain eventually compelled him to seek 
further tests in hospital early the following year.
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 Dulles was again diagnosed with cancer—
this time more serious and likely to prove fatal. As the once physically imposing Dulles 
began to suffer from dramatic weight loss and became gaunt and haggard, it impacted on his 
mood and the way he was perceived. In her account of his final year, his sister pointed to the 
fact that illness had taken its toll on Dulles’s moods and behaviour. 
There is reason to think that he tried at this time to reconcile his knowledge that 
the discomfort experienced in the last two months of that year [1958] might have 
grave meaning, with his inherent optimism of temperament and confidence in his 
physical strength. To one or two close friends he talked about the possibility that 
either persistent pain or a recurrence of cancer might lead to a blurring of his 
judgement, a state of mind that would render the execution of his job difficult. 
There is no doubt that his mood and even his condition changed from time to time 
from the end of October on.
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 Once he was compelled to seek hospital treatment in early 1959, observers began to 
judge him by referencing his illness. After he scurried from a six-day stay in the Walter Reed 
Hospital to a conference in Paris, the New York Times opined that even those that disagreed 
with Dulles on matters of policy would ‘agree in admiration of the energy and courage which 
make a man more than 70 years in age get up from a hospital bed and tear off on one of the 
most difficult diplomatic errands in all our history.’138 Drew Pearson, in a report on Dulles’s 
efforts in Paris, described how the other delegates were ‘talking to a sick but courageous 
man.’139 Though the reports typically made reference to his courage in seeking to fight 
against his illness, they were also clearly using his diminished health as a yardstick by which 
to measure his effectiveness.  
 For some, news of Dulles’s illnesses prompted reflections on what his loss might 
mean for the West’s prospects in the Cold War. In a telling assessment, at odds with the 
criticism that had often shaped its appraisals of his policies, the National Review noted:  
For six years Mr. Dulles has been the strict schoolmaster, the tough sergeant, the 
Catonian censor of the West. It is he who has said the ‘noes’ to the seductions and 
to the assaults of the enemy. The pupils, recruits or soft-living citizens have, as they 
always do, railed at the disciplinarian who has rapped their fingers digging into the 
fleshpots. But in our hearts we have all really known how lucky we are that Mr. 
Dulles has been on hand to check the tempter. Mr. Dulles has thus symbolized what 
remains of the West’s spirit of resistance, its will to survive. This is why, moreover, 




It was a view echoed, albeit in a rather different manner, by Harold Macmillan. Dulles, the 
British Prime Minister announced in Parliament, ‘is a figure whose very bigness is hardly 
realised until we are threatened with its absence’ and who had been a ‘great, important and 
vital figure in the life of the world.’141 Senator Mike Mansfield, another who had often 
clashed with Dulles, made a similar point. Being secretary of state, Mansfield said in the 
Senate, was a tough job: ‘the intellectual demands of the job are enormous...the physical 
demands are appalling.’ Given this, he continued, Dulles’s ‘stamina and durability’ had been 
remarkable. Still, he noted, ‘there is a physical limit’ and Dulles’s commitment to the job at 
hand had ‘taken its toll of his health.’142 
 Not everyone agreed of course. George Kennan, who remained furious with Dulles 
for his treatment of him in 1953, wrote in his diary that he struggled ‘to avoid a certain 
bitterness’ that was provoked in him ‘by Mr. Dulles latter day acceptance in Western opinion 
as a statesman of titanic dimensions. I cannot help but compare with my own powerlessness 
and relative obscurity the eulogies now heaped on this dying man.’143 Kennan had been 
roused to anger by the insinuation that Dulles’s illness was robbing the United States of its 
most stout-hearted diplomat at a time of great need. Writing in an opinion piece he ultimately 
decided (perhaps wisely) not to publish, Kennan argued that managing the nation’s foreign 
affairs had to be taken more seriously. ‘The least the United States can do in a moment of this 
sort,’ he wrote, ‘is to see that the conduct of its foreign relations is entrusted to a man who 
can give full time and vigor to the performance of this tremendous office.’144 It was, in truth, 
merely a much more sour version of the sort of opinion that had increasingly been 
characterising Democrats’ jeremiads against the Eisenhower administration since 1955. 
 Yet as well as shaping perceptions, Dulles’s illness was also having an impact on 
policy. One particular example of this was the mounting crisis over Berlin, which had been 
prompted in 1958 by Nikita Khrushchev’s ultimatum that the western powers sign a peace 
treaty with the East German government and recognise their legitimacy. Dulles’s stance on 
this was less bellicose than that of the president: whereas Eisenhower was sabre rattling and 
threatening the use of nuclear weapons and conventional forces, his secretary of state 
advocated a less pugnacious policy.
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 At the height of these tensions, in early 1959, Dulles 
spoke with West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, about his health in a car ride to the 
airport following a visit to Bonn. In all likelihood, Dulles told Adenauer, he would have to be 
‘looked over by the doctors’ on his return and might, perhaps, have to undergo an operation 
for a suspected hernia. This, he stressed, was top-secret; not even the president knew. But, 
Dulles continued, he was telling the West German chancellor because if he did have to have 
an operation ‘the press would play it up as a major affair and perhaps suggest that it was a 
recurrence of my malignancy.’ When Dulles’s allusions proved to be correct, he ordered a 
telegram to be sent to Adenauer as soon as he had come round from his sedation explaining 
what had happened, lest the chancellor think that the secretary had not been candid with him. 
Such actions suggest a man worried about his emotional ties to Adenauer, about the need for 
candour among allies, and also, a man eager to ensure that his illness did not get in the way of 
one of the most pressing foreign policy problems facing the United States.
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 On that front, 
Dulles told Eisenhower after he returned from Germany that Washington’s allies would 
believe Dulles to be the only person that could resolve the dispute over Berlin and, as such, it 
‘would be most important that they not get the impression that the Secretary’s illness would 
remove his influence from the scene.’ If they did, he suggested, then they might prove too 
willing to settle for an unfavourable agreement.
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 His rapidly declining health was not solely 
driving these shifts, of course, but it did provide an important part of the context in which his 
decisions were being made.  
 The end for Dulles, once the severity of his returned cancer was confirmed, was 
evidently not far away. But, even then, Eisenhower proved unwilling to readily accept his 
resignation.
148
 By the spring of 1959 and the time of his final meeting with Macmillan, 
however, this bore the sign of stubbornness and a refusal to contemplate the future rather than 
support for an ailing colleague. It was to no avail. Dulles eventually had to resign and, on 
May 24 1959, passed away. 
 
David Lawrence, the Conservative journalist, wrote a week after Dulles’s death that the 
former secretary of state ‘was brave in life and braver still as, with a full awareness of his 
fate, he approached the brink of death.’149 It was an appraisal that would have pleased Dulles 
greatly; he had long felt certain that being prepared to fight under the most trying of 
circumstances was a vital part of any policymaker’s make-up. In the first eight years of the 
Cold War, in fact, he had increasingly come to portray himself as the sort of masculine figure 
ideally suited to prosecuting a global struggle against Soviet Communism. He and 
Eisenhower had used this imagery relentlessly during the 1952 presidential campaign and had 
taken office on the back of a powerful commitment to inaugurating a more muscular and 
tough-minded foreign policy that carried with it significant emotional appeal. A more 
muscular rhetoric suffused the New Look foreign policy and characterised the ‘more bang for 
the buck’ styling of the administration’s massive retaliation policy. 
In Southeast Asia in 1954, these traits combined with an abiding antipathy toward 
British and French leaders—exemplified, in the minds of U.S. officials, by the persistent ill 
health being suffered by leaders in Paris and London—to push the administration toward a 
damaging position. Rather than engage with British proposals for a negotiated solution to the 
crisis in Indochina—a proposal that, with the benefit of hindsight, has come to look like an 
increasingly opportune way for the U.S. to have extricated itself from the region a decade 
before it committed to a ruinous land war in Asia—Eisenhower and Dulles sought to stiffen 
British and French resolve and derail the diplomatic process. Their belief that Britain and 
France were pathologically weak helped persuade them that a diplomatic solution was 
tantamount to surrender and appeasement.   
 The highly transient nature of such emotional tropes became apparent soon after when 
Eisenhower and Dulles were stricken by serious illness. This altered the way that the 
administration perceived the relationship between illness and international affairs. Beholden 
to the idea that any reverse for the U.S. was a gain for the Soviets, and wholly accepting of 
the belief that the image of American weakness could have profound consequences for the 
West’s position in the Cold War, the administration sought to ensure that its leading figures 
appeared to be as robust as they had ever been. Wide-ranging public relations attempts were 
undertaken in order to convey the sense of this being business as usual. But in the face of a 
significant shift in Soviet policy, which saw Moscow seeking to expand its influence in the 
global south, U.S. officials began to doubt their capacity to succeed. Furthermore, this went 
hand-in-hand with a retrenchment in U.S. national security policy, with the muscular rhetoric 
of massive retaliation abandoned for something that saw nuclear policy used as an instrument 
of containment rather than belligerence. The diagnosis of Dulles’s cancer compounded the 
situation. In the weeks and months that followed, Democrat charges of the administration’s 
weakness grew ever louder. When Eisenhower suffered a stroke in 1957, and the Soviets 
successfully launched Sputnik, the eruption of debates about a missile gap and American 
credibility were entwined with the broader context of serious ill health among U.S. leaders.  
Tellingly, it was at this supposed point of weakness that Dulles began to adopt more 
prudent policy positions; he even began to reconsider his approach toward the Soviet Union 
and mused on the benefits of cooperation with Moscow.
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 Moreover, it was a point that was 
picked up on in an editorial in The Nation—a publication that had been sharply critical of 
Dulles throughout his time at the State Department. Though noting that, in the past, it had 
been ‘more critical than commendatory’, the editorial went on to state that it was important to 
‘note the fact, neglected by most of the press, that as the Secretary’s health deteriorated, his 
diplomacy improved.’151 This, moreover, helps us to understand a surprising eulogy from 
Nikita Khrushchev. The Soviets had often opposed him, the Soviet leader announced, ‘but 
there had been an essential difference between his policy at the end of his term of office and 
that which he had pursued at the beginning.’ During recent talks, Khrushchev continued, it 
seemed as if Dulles was ‘giving up the struggle against Communism in countries of Eastern 
Europe’ and as if he was displaying ‘a more sober understanding of [the] prevailing 
international situation.’152 Had Dulles lived to see out his second term of secretary of state, in 
fact, it is possible that he might have pursued greater cooperation with Soviet leaders. He 
hadn’t tempered his dislike of the Soviet model, but he did now recognise the limitations of a 
policy that was so infused with aggressive rhetoric. And though there were undoubtedly clear 
strategic and economic imperatives effecting these decisions, the emotional consequences 
that had developed in response to perceptions about the finite lifetime of the human body 
were also exerting an important influence. 
By the time of Dulles’s death, the Democrats, and John Kennedy in particular, had 
come to see the allegations of weakness against the Republicans as a highly effective 
weapon. Firmly persuaded by the broader cultural narratives about the decline of American 
manhood and the need for U.S. policymakers and foreign policy actors to be tougher and 
more open to sacrifice, Kennedy’s campaign for the presidency was steeped in the language 
of masculinity and vigorous action.
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 Like Eisenhower and Dulles in the early 1950s it 
would be a position made by courting emotional responses and by making thinly veiled 
allusions to the relationship between good health, fitness, and the strength of the nation. 
When accepting the Democratic nomination in July 1960, indeed, Kennedy said that he 
embraced the nomination by stressing his willingness ‘to devote every effort of body, mind 
and spirit to lead our Party back to victory and our Nation back to greatness.’ ‘After eight 
years of drugged and fitful sleep,’ he continued, ‘this nation needs strong, creative 
Democratic leadership in the White House.’ The old ways would not do and a new generation 
of ‘young men who can cast off the old slogans and delusions and suspicions’ were needed to 
make America great again. The only ‘valid test of leadership,’ he proclaimed, ‘is the ability to 
lead, and lead vigorously.’154 
This position, of course, was largely a fiction. Kennedy himself suffered from chronic 
ill health and was one of the least healthy presidents ever to occupy the Oval Office. As 
Robert Dallek has argued in thoroughly charting Kennedy’s health problems, ‘[Kennedy] 
worried that disclosure of his repeated hospitalizations in the 1950s and his reliance on 
steroids to combat the debilitating effects of Addison’s disease and on antispasmodic 
painkillers, testosterone, antibiotics, and sleeping pills to help him cope with collateral 
problems would almost certainly block him from becoming president.’155 In this belief he was 
surely right. But the image was what mattered. Kennedy and the advisors he surrounded 
himself with conveyed the impression that they would oversee a new far more dynamic era in 
U.S. foreign relations. They came to office convinced that they had the opportunity to put 
U.S. foreign policy on a new footing. This can be seen in the administration’s ready embrace 
of Modernization Theory as a blueprint for galvanising and overseeing global development 
and, moreover, in Kennedy’s enthusiasm for the Green Berets who, he believed, could 
successfully prosecute a counter-insurgency operation in Southeast Asia. They, like the Peace 
Corps, were the epitome of what Kennedy and his advisors believed to be the very best 
Americans to pursue successful policies overseas.
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 The result was a policy that was too 
aggressive and too confident in certain areas and, more broadly, a presidency that was often 
marked by ‘a profound ambivalence’ and ‘an uncertainty over which direction the United 
States should take.’ Indeed, it was not until 1963, after the angst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
that Kennedy began to retreat from the bellicose positions that characterised his first two 
years in office and to try and take on the vested domestic interests that he believed were 
chiefly responsible for the continuance of the Cold War (and, even then, he continued to 




Focusing more closely on the way that perceptions of illness factored into U.S. 
thinking during this period, therefore, helps us to understand far more fully the profound 
impact that socially constructed perceptions of masculinity and emotions could have on 
American policymakers. Neither Eisenhower, Dulles or Kennedy felt that the way they 
viewed their own health and that of others had overweening strategic importance; yet they 
were all susceptible to engrained emotional responses about what serious illness meant and 
were aware of the fact that physical failings could be used as an allegory for national decline 
in the competitive arena of the struggle against the Soviets.
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 Their tendency to respond 
emotionally to perceived challenges to their masculinity, and to any sense that the “health” of 
the nation was imperilled, highlights the important ways in which culture can influence 
policy and the need for historians to think more expansively about the way that decisions 
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